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CASE NOTES 
Constitutional Law-FOURTH AMENDMENT~MMIGRATION CHECK- 
POINT STOPS FOR QUESTIONING ARE MASONABLE WJTHOUT INDIVI- 
DUALIZED S U S P I C I O N - U ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976). 
The instant case was a consolidation of two cases, both in- 
volving the constitutionality of stops for questioning at perma- 
nent immigration checkpoints removed from the Mexican border. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
conflicting decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 
The Ninth Circuit case, United States u. Martinez-Fuerte, 
consolidated three cases involving routine stops a t  the San Clem- 
ente, California, checkpoint to inquire about citizenship and ille- 
gal alienage,l pursuant to which all defendants were arrested for 
illegally transporting Mexican  alien^.^ Because of the large vol- 
ume of traffic at that checkpoint, a "point" officer screens traffic 
as it proceeds through the checkpoint lanes and selects a small 
percentage of the cars for referral to a secondary questioning 
area.4 None of the challenged stops a t  San Clemente involved 
suspicion based on any articulable facts; the illegal alienage of 
the defendants' passengers was discovered during questioning 
after discretionary referral to the secondary area. The Ninth Cir- 
cuit held such stops to be inconsistent with the fourth amend- 
ment because they were not justified by founded suspicion that 
the defendants' automobiles actually contained illegal  alien^.^ 
In the Fifth Circuit case, Sifuentes u. United States,"he 
defendant was stopped at  the Sarita, Texas, checkpoint where all 
1. 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), reu'd, 428 US.  543 (1976). 
2. Amado Martinez-Fuerte was convicted of illegally transporting aliens after his 
pretrial motion for suppression of evidence was denied. Id. a t  309-10. 
United States v. Jiminez-Garcia and United States v. Guillen were heard by a differ- 
ent judge and defense motions for suppression were granted. 428 US. a t  549 n.4. 
3. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that any person transporting an 
alien who he knows is illegally in the United States is guilty of a felony. 8 U.S.C. 8 
1324(a)(2) (1970). Three of the defendants in the Ninth Circuit case were also charged with 
conspiracy to commit the offense, a violation of 18 U.S.C. $ 371 (1970). 428 US.  a t  548- 
49. 
4. A full description of the checkpoint and procedure is set forth in the Court's 
opinion. 428 US.  at 545-47. Fewer than one percent of the cars are stopped for questioning. 
Id. at 563 n.16. 
5. 514 F.2d at 314-16. The circuit court reversed the conviction of Amado Martinez- 
Fuerte and affirmed the orders to suppress evidence in the other two cases. Id. at 322. 
6. 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1975) (mem.), aff'd, 428 US.  543 (1976). 
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cars are stopped and subjected to brief inquiry about citizenship. 
Sifuentes' car contained four illegal aliens who were slumped 
down in their seats and not visible to the officer until-he ap- 
proached the car. The officer's questions revealed the passengers' 
status as illegal aliens.' Sifuentes was convicted of illegally trans- 
porting aliens, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed? 
The Supreme Court, affirming the conviction in Sifuentes 
and reversing the decision in Martinez-Fuerte, held that check- 
point stops for questioning are constitutional under the fourth 
amendment even if not justified by individualized suspicion and 
that permanent checkpoint operation does not require the ad- 
vance authorization of a judicial warrant.' 
A. Historical Development of Immigration Search and Seizure 
Law 
1.  Statutory law 
Immigration search and seizure law has always had a statu- 
tory basis. The first act restricting immigration in 1875 contained 
search and seizure provisions and guidelines.1° These searches 
and seizures were limited to national borders until 1946, when 
immigration officers were first empowered to conduct warrantless 
searches "within a reasonable distance" from the border." The 
current authorization, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952,12 adopts this same "reasonable distance" standard for 
searches away from the border? Specifically, the Act now em- 
powers officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
7. 428 U.S. at 550. 
8. Sifuentes' conviction in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas was 
affirmed without a published opinion. United States v. Sifuentes, 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 
1975). The Fifth Circuit relied on its holding in United States v. Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922 
(5th Cir. 1975). See 428 U.S. a t  550. 
9. 428 U.S. at 545. 
10. The Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (implied repeal 1917), author- 
ized inspection by the collector of the port to search ships for undesirable aliens, such as 
felons or prostitutes, if he had reason to believe they were on board. 
11. Act of Aug. 7,1946, ch. 768,60 Stat. 865 (amending Act of Feb. 27, 1925, ch. 364, 
43 Stat. 1014, 1049) (repealed 1952). The 1925 Act had authorized the search of vehicles 
or conveyances in which the officer believed aliens were entering the country. The 1946 
Act deleted the language "in which he believes aliens are being brought in to the United 
States" and substituted "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the 
United States." 
12. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970). 
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(INS) without a warrant not only to board any vehicle or convey- 
ance within a reasonable distance from the border to search for 
aliens, but also to interrogate anyone believed to be an alien 
concerning his right to be in the country.14 Pursuant to a regula- 
tion promulgated by the Attorney General, a reasonable distance 
was defined to be within 100 miles of an external boundary of the 
United States.15 
2. Early judicial determinations 
The INS power to search and interrogate away from the bor- 
der without a warrant or probable cause has long been recognized 
by the courts. But the only Supreme Court statement on the 
subject prior to 197316 was dictum in a 1925 Prohibition Act easel7 
recognizing a probable cause exception at  the border: 
Travellers may be so stopped [on the chance of finding 
something illegal in each automobile] in crossing an interna- 
tional. boundary . . . . But those lawfully within the country 
. . . have a right to free passage without interruption or search 
unless there is known to be a competent official authorized to 
search, [and] probable cause for believing that their vehicles 
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.18 
While that statement indicated a limitation on the government's 
power to search or seize once a person is within the country,l"t 
14. 8 U.S.C. 8 1357(a) (1970): 
(a) Powers without warrant. 
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations . . . 
shall have power without warrant- 
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to 
his right to be . . . in the United States; 
. . . . 
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary . . . to 
board and search for aliens any vessel . . . conveyance, or vehicle . . . 
and within . . . twenty-five miles from any such external boundary 
to have access to private lands, but not dwellings . . . . 
15. 8 C.F.R. 287.1(a)(2) (1977). This provision has been in effect without material 
changes since 1947. 12 Fed. Reg. 2744 (1947) amended the then current regulation by 
adding a section that defined "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary" 
to mean "within a distance not exceeding 100 air miles from any external boundary." 
16. In 1973 the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 
266 (1973). For facts and holding, see notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text infra. 
17. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
18. Id. at 154. 
19. In 1925 when the statement was made, immigration law did not provide for 
searches and seizures away from the border. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
Customs search statutes, however, did authorize searches and seizures away from the 
border. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text infra. 
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has been cited by circuit courts in validating immigration or cus- 
toms searches both at and away from the border.20 
Circuit courts consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
warrantless immigration searches and seizures conduct& away 
from the border within the 100 mile administrative limit.21 The 
justification for the searches and seizures, although not generally 
articulated, appears to have been that the statutory authoriza- 
tion provided a presumption of reasonableness under the fourth 
amendment.22 While the probable cause requirement for warrants 
was imposed on other warrantless searches and seizures to ensure 
reasonableness, border searches conducted by customs or immi- 
gration officials were treated as a statutory exception to a proba- 
ble cause req~irernent.~~ Greater law enforcement discretion was 
thus authorized for immigration and custom officials. 
3. Almeida-Sanchez and its progeny 
Current case law relies in part on distinctions between the 
three basic modes of INS law enforcement operation away from 
the border: First, permanent checkpoints are established where 
major roads from the border converge; second, temporary check- 
20. E.g., United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968); Thomas 
v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1967). 
21. E.g., United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 
(1973) (search for aliens upon reasonable suspicion is constitutional within a reasonable 
distance of the border); United States v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1972) (stop 
and search for aliens within 100 air miles of border is reasonable); United States v. 
McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (held search 7 
miles from border to be reasonable as authorized but withheld blanket approval of the 
100-mile limit); Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971) (immigration 
searches within 100 miles of border do not violate fourth amendment); Fernandez v. 
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963) (stop for questioning within 100 miles was 
constitutional); United States v. Correia, 207 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1953) (right to interrogate, 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(l) (1970), is constitutional); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th 
Cir. 1952) (search for aliens at checkpoint north of Florida Keys constitutional under the 
1946 Act). 
22. The general approach is best summarized by the Fifth Circuit's statement in 
Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1952): "Obviously there is a strong 
presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially when the Act turns 
on what is reasonable . . . ." But cf. United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cii),  
cert. denied, 414 U.S.  821 (1973) (requiring reasonable suspicion to search); United States 
v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (withheld 
blanket approval of the 100-mile limit; some searches might not be reasonable); Au Yi 
Lau v. United States Immig. & Nat. Serv., 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
864 (1971) (reasonable suspicion required for INS to forcibly stop and interrogate). 
23. See generally Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal 
Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1972); Comment, 
Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968). 
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points are periodically established on other roads near the border; 
and third, roving patrols operate along roads that smugglers of 
aliens may use to circumvent  checkpoint^.^^ The fourth amend- 
ment protections applicable to these searches and seizures have 
become a subject of increasing interest since the Supreme Court 
first ruled on an INS search procedure away from the border. 
In Almeida-Sanchez u. United States,25 the Supreme Court 
disallowed the exception to a probable cause requirement for a 
warrantless immigration search by a roving patrol away from the 
border. The government had claimed statutory justification for 
the warrantless search without probable cause, relying on part of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952." The Court held 
this statutory probable cause exception to be inconsistent with 
the fourth amendment for searches occurring at  points away from 
the border or its "functional  equivalent^."^^ 
Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarifiedZ8 and 
extended traditional fourth amendment protections to other 
immigration search and seizure situations. In United States v. 
or ti^,^^ the Court extended the probable cause requirement an- 
nounced for roving patrol searches in Almeida-Sanchez to perma- 
nent checkpoint searches away from the border." The same day, 
the Court held in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce31 that reasona- 
24. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976). 
25. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The border patrol stopped and searched a car without proba- 
ble cause on a road twenty-five miles north of the border and parallel to it. Id. at 268. 
(The circuit court opinion reported the distance as 50 miles.) The Ninth Circuit had 
upheld the search as valid based on 8 U.S.C. 8 1357 (1970), the 100-mile distance outlined 
by federal regulation, and its prior decisions. 452 F.2d 459, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1971). 
26. The government relied on 8 U.S.C. 6 1357(a)(3) (1970). Note 14 supra. 
27. "Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might 
be, searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border 
itself, but at its functional equivalents as well." 413 U.S. at 272. 
Although functional equivalent was not defined, the Court gave two examples of 
places away from the border that might be considered functional equivalents: An interna- 
tional airport and an established stop near the border where two or more roads from the 
border converge. Id. at 273. 
28. In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), the Court declared that the 
Almeida-Sanchez probable cause requirement was not to be applied retroactively to rov- 
ing patrol searches. Id. at 534-35. In Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), the 
Almeida-Sanchez standard was held to be nonretroactive in relation to permanent check- 
point searches. Id. at 918-19. 
29. 422 U.S. 891 (1975). 
30. Id. at 896-98. The Court again required the search to be at a functional equivalent 
of the border for an exception to the probable cause standard. It did not articulate further 
guidelines to determine functional equivalency. The search in Ortiz occurred a t  the San 
Clemente checkpoint. Id. at 896-97. 
31. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
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ble suspicion32 was required to justify a stop for questioning by a 
roving patrol." The stop, a seizure under the fourth amendment, 
was limited to questioning about illegal alienage; no search was 
involved. Among the many questions not yet addressedqby the 
Supreme Court, and explicitly reserved in Ortiz, was that of the 
applicable constitutional standards for stops a t  permanent 
checkpoints away from the border.34 
The change in immigration search and seizure law requiring 
some form of individualized suspicion ( i .e . ,  probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion) for INS searches and stops for questioning 
away from the border has generally not been liberally applied by 
those circuit courts which, by virtue of their geographical loca- 
tions along the southern border, deal with Mexican aliens. The 
Fifth and Tenth Circuits have construed the Supreme Court deci- 
sions narrowly35 and allowed checkpoint stops without individual- 
32. The Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce called the standard "reasonable suspi- 
cion" and defined it as "specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from 
those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion." Id. at 884. The circuit court decision 
required "founded suspicion." 499 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1974). The two standards, 
founded suspicion and reasonable suspicion, are equivalent. Both originate from the stan- 
dard established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), sometimes referred to as articulable 
suspicion. 
33. 422 U.S. at 882-84. The stop was made by a patrol car near the San Clemente 
checkpoint. The checkpoint was not operating due to inclement weather, and the patrol 
car had picked out Brignoni-Ponce's car because its occupants were of Mexican ancestry. 
Questioning revealed the occupants' illegal alienage. No challenge was made to the Ninth 
Circuit's characterization of the stop as a roving patrol rather than a permanent check- 
point stop. Id. at 874-75. The Court also specifically declared that apparent Mexican 
ancestry alone was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. at 886-87. 
34. 422 U.S. at 897 n.3. 
35. The Tenth Circuit limited the precedent's effect by characterizing functional 
equivalency as a question of fact for the district courts. They found checkpoints 98 miles 
from the border to be functional equivalents. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353, 357-60 
(10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Maddox, 485 F.2d 361, 363 (10th Cir. 1973). 
Although the Fifth Circuit applied the probable-cause-to-search requirement of 
Almeida-Sanchez to roving patrols and temporary checkpoints, United States v. Speed, 
489 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1052, rev'd 520 F.2d 
322 (5th Cir. 1975), it declined to extend it to mobile checkpoints (those that alternate 
between two and three fixed locations), United States v. Cantu, 504 F.2d 387, 389 (5th 
Cir. 1974), or permanent checkpoints, United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), 
vacated, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1976) (after review in light of 
Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce). 
The Fifth Circuit further limited the Supreme Court decisions by analyzing the 
search or seizure in two steps. The first was to ascertain whether the initial stop was 
constitutionally valid. Then the subsequent search was examined for constitutional justi- 
fication. If the initial stop was valid (as were checkpoint stops without reasonable suspi- 
cion), then a search for aliens did not require probable cause. United States v. Cantu, 510 
F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1975). The court stated: "Once they had stopped the car, [valid under 
the statute and 100-mile regulation,] they were empowered to search for aliens." Id. at 
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ized su~picion.~~ The Ninth Circuit, however, has required a form 
of individualized suspicion for all searches and seizures occurring 
away from the border.37 
B. The  Reasonableness Standard of the Fourth Amendment  
The recent concern of the courts with delineating constitu- 
tional safeguards for immigration searches away from the border 
calls for a closer analysis of the protection guaranteed by the 
Constitution. The text of the fourth amendment38 establishes 
both a substantive protection, that a citizen's right to be secure 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
and a procedural safeguard, that no warrant shall issue but upon 
1004. Any search for contraband, however, required probable cause. United States v. 
Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975). 
The Fifth Circuit continued to recognize searches for aliens at permanent checkpoints 
without probable cause after Ortiz because the court determined the checkpoints to be 
"functional equivalents." E.g., United States v. Hart, 525 F.2d 1199, 1200 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(checkpoint was on the interstate 20 miles north of and parallel to the border). Accord, 
United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 401 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1975); United States v. 
Fuentes, 379 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1975). 
36. United States v. Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973). 
The constitutionality of checkpoint stops without founded suspicion continued to be 
upheld by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Coffey, 520 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam), after remand by the Supreme Court for consideration in light of Brignoni-Ponce 
and Ortiz. 422 U.S. 1054, vacating 509 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1975) (mem.). 
37. The Ninth Circuit required probable cause for checkpoint searches before the 
Supreme Court's Ortiz decision by holding most permanent checkpoints not to be 
"functional equivalents." See United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 
916 (1975). Functional equivalency was limited to locations "where virtually everyone 
searched has just come from the other side of the border." 500 F.2d at 965. 
Stops for questioning at checkpoints were sanctioned only upon founded suspicion. 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); 
United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974). The court did, however, 
recognize stops if founded suspicion developed as a car "rolled through" a checkpoint. 
United States v. Evans, 507 F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 
(1975). 
The court also invalidated a judicially authorized checkpoint warrant as violative of 
the fourth amendment. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), 
reu'd, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Cf. United States v. Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(stop a t  a temporary checkpoint is unauthorized). 
38. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma- 
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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probable cause. The substantive protection applies to all searches 
and seizures: whether warrantless or authorized by a warrant, 
they must be reasonable. The procedural requirement specifies 
the standards for issuing a warrant that ensure the reasonable- 
ness of the search or seizure. While the fourth amendment's sub- 
stantive protection is generally afforded in terms of the warrant 
requirement, the Constitution does not mandate warrants in all 
situations; it only prohiibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The standard of reasonableness for warrantless searches and sei- 
zures is therefore not specified in the amendment but is left for 
interpretation. The lack of clarity in this standard is aptly illus- 
trated by the many warrantless INS search and seizure proce- 
dures that were once considered reasonable because of the stat- 
utes and regulations authorizing and defining them, but are now 
reasonable only when additional protection is afforded by ele- 
ments of the warrant requirement. Courts have generally required 
that warrantless intrusions conform to one of the warrant require- 
ments, the probable cause standard, in order to ensure reasona- 
b l e n e ~ s . ~ ~  For this reason, the probable cause and reasonableness 
standards have come to be regarded by many as equivalents. 
It is not axiomatic, however, that the substantive protection 
in warrantless situations should be ensured by the same proce- 
dural safeguards required for warrants. The historical setting, 
recent scholarship, and some judicial authority all support the 
position that the fourth amendment's procedural protections, 
particularly probable cause, are not always necessary for a rea- 
sonable warrantless search or seizure. 
1.  The historical setting and congressional enactments 
The authors of the fourth amendment apparently considered 
certain warrantless searches to be reasonable without probable 
cause. A customs search statute authorizing a warrantless search 
based only upon the customs officer's belief that goods subject to 
duty were on board a shipd0 was passed by the same Congress that 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,51 (1970); 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,101-02 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
149, 154 (1925). 
40. The Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790), authorized 
customs officials to search any ship in which they had "reason to suspect" goods subject 
to duty were concealed. The Act specified issue of a warrant on oath or aflkmation if they 
had "cause to suspect" the goods were concealed in a "particular" building or dwelling. 
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resolved to submit the Bill of Rights to the states for ratificatione41 
This statute was replaced in 1790 by another statute with ex- 
panded provisions not even requiring the officer's belief." Similar 
customs search authorization, including some expansions, has 
continued to the present.43 
Passage of the first customs statute by the same Congress 
that drafted the Bill of Rights, when viewed in light of English 
writs of assistance," argues persuasively against applying warrant 
requirements to all warrantless searches and seizures. These writs 
of assistance were general area warrants, and their use has been 
widely recognized as one of the primary grievances leading to the 
American Revol~t ion.~~ The probable cause and particularity re- 
quirements outlined in the fourth amendment for warrants were 
designed to protect citizens from the abuses of these writs. Al- 
though the first customs act passed by Congress authorized war- 
rantless searches conditioned only on the officer's belief that 
goods subject to duty were on the ship, Congress apparently con- 
sidered the problem of a general area warrant to be eliminated 
by limiting these warrantless searches to vessels. In order to 
search buildings or dwellings for goods subject to duties, the stat- 
ute required a warrant meeting what later became fourth amend- 
ment standards.46 
Statutory authorization for warrantless searches and seizures 
at the border on less than probable cause has not been limited to 
41. A joint resolution, passed by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, proposed 
twelve articles, ten of them forming our current Bill of Rights, to be ratified by the state 
legislatures as constitutional amendments. Resolution, 1 Stat. 97 (1789). The ten were 
ratified by 1791. Amendments to the Constitution, 1 Stat. 21, n.a (1789). 
42. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, $ 31, 1 Stat. 145 (repealed 1799). 
43. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627 (repealed 1922). Section 54 contained 
essentially the same provisions as 6 31 of the 1790 Act. Section 46 of the statute authorized 
the discretionary search of a person's baggage when he arrived in the country. Sections 
105 and 106 also extended these powers to entries made in the western districts by vessels, 
boats, and carriages. The Act of Mar. 3,1815, ch. 94, 6 2,3 Stat. 231 (expired 1822), made 
the powers more explicit for land travel and specifically stated a warrant was not neces- 
sary. 
Current statutory authority allows search of persons and baggage pursuant to regula- 
tions issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, Tariff Act of 1930,19 U.S.C. 6 1582 (1970), 
and search of vessels, vehicles, and beasts, when the officers suspect goods subject to duty, 
19 U.S.C. 6 482 (1970) (Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 6 3, 14 Stat. 178). 
44. These writs authorized constables to break and enter houses, shops and any 
"other place" to seize prohibited or uncustomed goods. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, 6 5 (1662). 
But see Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF TIB 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 43-49 (R. Morris ed. 1939). Dickerson argues that the practice, 
not the statute, made the writs "general warrants." 
45. Dickerson, supra note 44, at 40. 
46. See note 40 supra. 
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customs searches. Similar broad authority has been granted for 
immigration searches and seizures." Throughout its history, Con- 
gress has neither required a warrant nor considered probable 
cause necessary to ensure reasonableness in customs and immi- 
gration searches and seizures of statutorily limited scope. 
2. Judicial authority and the reasonableness standard for 
warrantless searches and seizures 
The judiciary has also treated the reasonableness standard 
as partially independent of the warrant requirements in certain 
warrantless situations when legitimate law enforcement interests 
would be impaired by adherence to that standard. In Terry u. 
Ohio, 48 the Supreme Court created the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard based on the fourth amendment's reasonableness lan- 
guage for a specific factual setting, stop and frisk, where both a 
warrant and probable cause were considered inappropriate." This 
lesser standard of individualized suspicion also required judicial 
limitations on the extent of the intrusion to ensure reasonable- 
ness; judicial review of the facts against an objective standard 
was still required to ensure meaningful application of the fourth 
amendment protections. Brignoni-Ponce extended the reasonable 
suspicion standard to another warrantless law enforcement proce- 
dure, a stop for questioning by a roving patrol. 
In addition to the Supreme Court decisions applying the 
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion to certain warrantless sit- 
uations, some members of the Court have stressed the importance 
of looking beyond the warrant requirements to the reasonableness 
requirement in order to give greater recognition to law enforce- 
ment needs. Chief Justice Burger, for example, opined: 
Perhaps these decisions [Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz] will 
be seen in perspective as but another example of a society seem- 
ingly impotent to deal with massive lawlessness. In that sense 
history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and 
appropriate concern for individual rights, unable- or unwill- 
ing-to apply the concept of reasonableness explicit in the 
Fourth Amendment in order to develop a rational accommoda- 
tion between those rights and the literal safety of the country.50 
47. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra. 
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
49. Id. a t  8-9, 21-22, 30-31. 
50. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. a t  899 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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State and lower federal courts have also authorized certain 
seizures without probable cause when the law enforcement inter- 
est is sufficient. Stopping automobiles a t  roadblockss1 and various 
checkpointss2 has been judicially recognized as reasonable despite 
the intrusion on many innocent travelers. The requirement that 
all vehicles stop is one of the factors that courts have sometimes 
considered to ensure reasonableness in these  situation^.^^ Addi- 
tional protection is afforded by limiting the extent of the stop; 
probable cause has been required for intrusions exceeding the 
authorized purpose of the stop.54 
On the other hand, this concern for law enforcement interests 
has sometimes resulted in a dilution of the fourth amendment 
probable cause requirement for warrants. This divorce of proba- 
ble cause from the reasonableness requirement for warrants evi- 
dences confusion in the application of the fourth amendment's 
substantive and procedural protections. In Camara v. Municipal 
Court,55 for instance, the Supreme Court required a warrant for 
administrative housing inspections. The Court distorted the 
probable cause requirement, however, because that requirement 
was considered satisfied simply upon showing the reasonableness 
of the search.56 This reasonableness involved no individualized 
suspicion. In addition, the Camara warrant can be issued for an 
area as well as a specific dwelling and thus presents an apparent 
conflict with the fourth amendment's mandate that a "warrant 
51. E.g., United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976) (roadblock for drivers 
license check on freeway); United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975) (random 
stops for drivers license checks); City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959) 
( (roadblock for drivers license check); People v. Euctice, 371 Ill. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83 (1939) (roadblock immediately following felony commission); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 
S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962) (roadblock for license and registration check); Williams v. State, 
226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719 (1961) (roadblock after felony commission). 
52. E.g., Stephensonv. Department of Agr. & Consum. Servs., 329 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (agriculture inspection station for trucks). 
53. See, e.g., id. at 377; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Ky. 
1962). 
54. See, e.g., Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504, 193 P.2d 470, 474 (1948) 
(general search for evidence of crimes by roadblock without a warrant is illegal); City of 
Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784, 788-89 (Fla. 1959) (stop for license check does not 
convey power to search); Stephenson v. Department of Agr. & Consum. Servs., 329 So. 
2d 373, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (statute required consent or warrant for a search); 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686,687 (Ky. 1962) (stops cannot have an ulterior 
motive). Cf. United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 1976) (probable 
cause, developed after the stop, justified the issuance of a warrant to search trailer). 
55. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
56. The Court stated: "But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid 
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue 
a suitably restricted search warrant." Id. a t  539. 
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shall issue" only upon probable cause supported by a particular- 
ized description of the subject of the search or seizure.57 This 
holding particularly illustrates confusion over the fourth amend- 
ment's protections because it overruled Supreme Court precedent 
that administrative housing inspections (searches) were reasona- 
ble without a warrant.58 
3. Recent scholarship 
Legal commentators have recognized the difference between 
the warrant and reasonableness requirements of the fourth 
amendment. The differences between warrant and warrantless 
situations are considered to be important for application of these 
fourth amendment standards. Historically there has been a shift 
of emphasis on these standards. The concern at  the time of the 
drafting of the fourth amendment was with overly general war- 
rants, not with warrantless searches and seizures.59 Thus, current 
reliance on the warrant as a "touchstone" of reasonableness 
under the fourth amendment has caused one scholar to claim that 
the courts have "stood the Fourth Amendment on its head."60 
Ironically, the warrant requirements, originally imposing a more 
rigorous control on the issuance of a warrant, have been eviscer- 
ated in some warrant situations to meet law enforcement needs, 
while the warrant requirements have been applied to other situa- 
tions (that were originally reasonable without warrants) in de- 
rogation of law enforcement interests. 
In an attempt to establish sound doctrine for searches or 
seizures both with and without a warrant, legal scholars have 
pointed to the importance of the distinction between the fourth 
amendment's warrant and reasonableness requirements. While 
legal commentators acknowledge the historical reversal from pro- 
tection from warrants to protection by warrants," they are di- 
57. For the complete text of the fourth amendment, see note 38 supra. 
In Martinez-Fuerte the Court suggests that the greater intrusion on privacy when 
searching a private residence and the traditional warrant requirement for such searches 
may have been the reason for the Court requiring a warrant in Camara. 428 U.S.  564-65. 
58. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The dissent in Camara claimed that 
the decision was a prostitution of the fourth amendment and that better protection would 
be afforded if it were authorized as a reasonable warrantless search. 387 US. at 546-55 
(Clark, J., dissenting). 
59. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra. 
60. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-24, 38-46 (1969). 
61. E.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
367 (1974). 
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vided on the appropriate application of the reasonableness doc- 
trine to warrantless  intrusion^?^ One suggestion, a sliding scale 
of safeguards that vary with the intrusiveness of the search or 
seizure, holds some promise,63 but harbors potential problems.64 
In spite of the diversity of recommendations, scholars generally 
consider a greater focus on the fourth amendment's reasonable- 
ness requirement independent of the warrant requirements to be 
desirable. 65 
In the instant case, the Court defined the protection afforded 
by the fourth amendment as freedom from arbitrary and oppres- 
sive interference into privacy and personal security by law en- 
forcement official~,~%nd declared that weighing the public inter- 
est against the fourth amendment interests of the individual is 
the procedure to be followed in establishing constitutional safe- 
guard~.~'  This balancing was used to resolve the question whether 
to require reasonable suspicion to validate the stop for question- 
ing, a seizure under the fourth amendment? The Court found a 
strong public interest in authorizing stops without reasonable 
suspicion, since the traffic on major routes is too heavy for an 
officer to have more than a brief opportunity to observe any single 
car and develop the requisite suspicion. Thus, the checkpoint's 
deterrent effect on smugglers of aliens would be lost if reasonable 
suspicion were required? In addition, the Court noted that while 
such stops intrude on a right to free passage and, to a more 
limited extent, on the right to personal security, the magnitude 
of this intrusion is less than for roving patrol stops.70 
62. One scholar recommends categorizing searches and seizures by fact situation so 
that standards of reasonableness can be delineated. E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 47-52 (1975). Another proposes administrative rules by 
police departments that outline procedures for searches and seizures that are reviewed for 
reasonableness. Amsterdam, supra note 61, at 416-17. 
63. See Amsterdam, supra note 61, a t  390-93. 
64. See id. at 375-76, 393-94. See also E. GRISWOLD, supra note 62, at 39-42. 
65. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 61, at 414-18; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 62, 
at 49-52; T. TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 46-50. 
66. 428 U.S. at 554. The Court supported this definition by citing Brignoni-Ponce, 
Ortiz, and Camara. 
67. 428 U.S. at 555. As authority for the balancing analysis, the Court cited Brignoni- 
Ponce and Terry and described the balancing and resultant protections used in Almeida- 
Sanchez and Brignoni-Ponce. 
68. 428 U.S. at 556. 
69. Id. at 556-57. For the facts the Court relied upon to establish the magnitude of 
the illegal alien problem, see id. at 551-54. 
70. Id. at 557-60. While the objective intrusion is the same, the Court considered the 
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In delineating the constitutional protections required, the 
Court declared that "some quantum of individualized suspicion 
is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. But 
the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of 
such suspi~ion."~~ The Court granted wide discretion to the field 
officers in selectively referring cars to the secondary inspection 
area a t  San Clemente, noting that even if the referrals made are 
based upon apparent Mexican ancestry, there is no constitutional 
v i o l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The individual's protection was guaranteed by limita- 
tions on the intrusiveness of the stop and the nature and location 
of the checkpoint. The Court relied on the fact that location of 
fixed checkpoints is a high level administrative decision in which 
factors such as inconvenience to the public are   on side red.'^ The 
Court rejected the argument for a warrant requirementr4 because 
the stop had sufficient constitutional protections without a war- 
rant75 and did not involve the search of a dwelling? 
difference in the subjective intrusion between a checkpoint and a roving patrol to be a 
significant distinction. The elements of this subjective intrusion were described as concern 
over authority to stop, fright, and surprise. Id. at 558-59. The stigmatizing effect, occur- 
ring when only a few cars are referred for secondary questioning a t  the San Clemente 
checkpoint, was considered not to involve fright but to actually further some fourth 
amendment protections by minimizing the intrusion on others. Id. at 560. The Court saw 
a minimized intrusion as being a furtherance rather than a violation of protection. The 
dissent viewed this as a convolution of fourth amendment guarantees. Id. at 572 n.2 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted). For authority the Court cited Camara, where 
area warrants were authorized without particularized knowledge of individual dwellings. 
72. 428 US .  at 563. The Court's reasoning was that due to the minimal intrusion not 
requiring individual justification, wide discretion was necessary. The Court accepted the 
government's assertion that apparent Mexican ancestry is not the sole criterion for referral 
and supported this by figures indicating far fewer cars are referred for questioning than 
would contain persons of Mexican ancestry based on population percentages in Southern 
California. Id. at n.16. 
The dissent points out that this fails to take into account the percentage of the 
population with apparent Mexican ancestry that drive cars as compared to the population 
a t  large. This arbitrariness and potential discrimination is challenged by the dissent as 
being unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. a t  571-73 & n.4. 
73. Id. at 559, 565-66. The Court also emphasized the possibility of poststop judicial 
review of checkpoint location as an additional safeguard. 
74. The Ninth Circuit decision dealt entirely with the warrant issue. See note 37 
supra. Sifuentes used the warrant requirement as an alternate theory to attack the consti- 
tutionality of the stop in this case. 428 US. at 564. 
75. 428 U.S. at 565-66. The protections of a warrant considered to be already provided 
were assurance of authority, control of officer discretion, and prevention of hindsight 
distorting the reasonableness evaluation. 
76. Id. This factual difference was used to distinguish the case from Camara. See 
notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra. The fourth amendment has been held to pro- 
vide greater protection of homes than automobiles. McDonald v. United States, 335 US.  
451 (1948). 
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The instant case marks a reversal in the Court's trend to 
require either probable cause for warrantless searches or reasona- 
ble suspicion for warrantless stops by the INS away from an 
international border. Although there is some justification for this 
different treatment because the seizure in the instant case is ei- 
ther less intrusive or made under more controlled conditions than 
the immigration searches or seizures previously considered by the 
Court, the absence of a requirement of individualized suspicion 
in this case raises important questions about both the nature of 
an individual's fourth amendment guarantee and the appropriate 
procedural safeguards to ensure the inviolability of that guaran- 
tee in warrantless situations. 
Accordingly, this case note will focus on certain fourth 
amendment procedural standards of protection and on analytical 
frameworks for determining the reasonableness of these stan- 
dards." The analysis will first examine the efficacy of two alterna- 
tive procedural requirements that the Court could have applied 
to ensure the reasonableness of interrogatory checkpoint stops 
under the fourth amendment. Next, it will analyze the Court's 
balancing approach and show that this method of determining 
reasonableness fails to ensure the inviolability of individual 
fourth amendment rights. Finally, an alternative analytical 
framework for determining reasonableness will be proposed that 
ensures protection of these individual rights without unnecessar- 
ily hindering law enforcement interests. 
A. Alternative Procedural Requirements to Ensure 
Reasonableness 
I .  The c heckpoint warrant proposal 
A checkpoint warrant is a general warrant authorizing sei- 
zures a t  a specific checkpoint for a limited period of time. The 
warrant is issued after review by a federal magistrate of an INS 
affidavit setting forth the grounds for suspecting illegal aliens in 
the traffic passing through that checkpoint? This area warrant 
77. This case note will not address the questions raised by the decision concerning 
which situations should be included in the Court's holding (i.e., temporary checkpoints, 
nonimmigration checkpoints) or the necessary limitations and clarification that should 
come from future decisions. 
78. For details of the procedure, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 
310-12 (9th Cir. 1975), rev 'd, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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requires no individualized probable cause, but rests any protec- 
tion it affords on the judicial officer's conclusion that the proba- 
ble incidence of immigration violations at the checkpoint justifies 
stops for questioning. 
The Court had ample authority for sanctioning a checkpoint 
warrant procedure. A warrant had been issued for the San Clem- 
ente che~kpoint,'~ and the warrant requirement was urged as an 
alternative by defendant S i fuen te~ .~~  Such a procedure first found 
expression in Camarasl for administrative housing inspections 
and was recommended in Almeida-Sanchez by Justice Powell as 
an alternative in the context of immigration searches and sei- 
z u r e ~ . ~ ~  
The Court, however, rejected a checkpoint warrant in the 
instant case, claiming that fourth amendment rights could be 
protected without it. The Court distinguished Camara, g3 in that 
79. A copy of the "warrant of inspection" is set forth in full in the circuit court's 
opinion. 514 F.2d at 311 n.2. 
The warrant was not a requirement mandated by the courts. The rationale for obtain- 
ing the warrant appears to have been the Ninth Circuit's statement in United States v. 
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1974), requiring a permanent checkpoint search to be 
based on probable cause. This attempt to justify checkpoint operation by a warrant was 
apparently premature because the Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for the 
statement. The decision in Bowen allowed the checkpoint search because the standard of 
Almeida-Sanchez was held to be nonretroactive. The Bowen court, however, also decided 
that absent probable cause permanent checkpoint stops and searches would be unconsti- 
tutional under Almeida-Sanchez. For a discussion of the Almeida-Sanchez standard, see 
text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, 
it chastized the Ninth Circuit for deciding the latter issue because the nonretroactivity 
holding was sufficient to dispose of the case. Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916, 920- 
21 (1975). In any event, the warrant failed to survive judicial review in the Ninth Circuit. 
514 F.2d at 332. 
80. Note 74 and accompanying text supra. 
81. Notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra. 
82. Such a warrant procedure was outlined as a possibilityfor roving patrols. 413 U.S. 
a t  283-84 (concurring opinion). Justice Powell proposed the warrant as a way to balance 
legitimate government needs and constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 275. He then 
suggested four criteria to consider in issuing the warrant: First, known or reasonably 
believed frequency of illegal alien traffic; second, proximity to the border; third, geograph- 
ical considerations; and fourth, probable degree of interference with rights of innocent 
persons. Id. at 283-84. 
The area warrant proposal received support from legal writers following Almeida- 
Sanchez. See, e.g., Leahy, Border Patrol Checkpoint Operation Under Warrants of Inspec- 
tion: The Wake of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 62, 63-67, 69- 
70 (1974); Note, Fourth Amendment Applications to Searches Conducted by Immigration 
Oficials, 38 ALB. L. REV. 962,975 (1974); Note, The Extent of the Border, 1 HAST. CONST. 
L.Q. 235, 245-50 (1974); 27 VAND. L. REV. 523, 534-35 (1974). But see Note, Almeida- 
Sanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone Search Law, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 214, 
242-47 (1975); Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Ca- 
mara, 84 YALE L.J. 355, 361-71 (1974). 
83. See notes 55-57 & 76 and accompanying text supra. 
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the seizure in the instant case did not involve the search of a 
dwelling and the notification function of a warrantB4 was not 
needed. More importantly in the present context, the Court con- 
sidered judicial review of the administrative decision on check- 
point location to be a sufficient substitute for judicial review of 
field officer's d i sc re t i~n .~~ 
While the Court's latter reason attempts to satisfy a well 
known purpose of the warrant requirement, mere review of check- 
point location will not fully control law enforcement discretion. 
There are two types of discretion involved in border patrol stops 
for questioning: Discretion as to where cars are stopped and dis- 
cretion as to which cars are stopped. The Court's protection re- 
moves the former from absolute law enforcement control, but the 
decision eliminates arbitrarinessB6 in the exercise of the latter only 
when all cars are stopped. At San Clemente there was no admin- 
istrative or judicial control of field officer discretion in selecting 
the cars to be stopped. An area warrant would likewise fail to 
eliminate arbitrariness in the exercise of this discretion, since it 
does not control the manner of checkpoint operation. 
Furthermore, while the Court properly rejected the area war- 
rant procedure, its reasons for doing so overlooked the fundamen- 
tal flaw with an area warrant: Such a warrant ignores the fourth 
amendment's procedural warrant requirements that "no War- 
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized." Probable cause and particularity are individualized 
requirements that are violated by the general authorization pro- 
84. One of the purposes of a warrant established by the Court in Camara was to 
assure the citizen that the inspector was duly authorized to inspect and to define for the 
citizen the limits of the inspection. 387 U.S. a t  532-33. This notification function appears 
to take on greater significance when the warrant is issued on less than traditional probable 
cause. 
The notification function was performed at  the checkpoint by the officers' uniforms 
and the clearly visible signs. 428 U.S. a t  546, 565. 
85. This view represents a change in the Court's position, since the Court in Almeida- 
Sanchez was particularly concerned with field officer discretion. 413 U.S. at 270. For a 
discussion of the judicial control necessary to curb this discretion, see Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 
(1948). 
86. The primary concern of courts in warrantless searches and seizures has been the 
evil of unbridled law enforcement discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 
(1964). 
464 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
vided by an area-type ~ a r r a n t . ~ '  Authorizing such a warrant 
would maintain the confusion between the fourth amendment's 
substantive reasonableness guarantee and the procedural proba- 
ble cause requirement-a confusion that has beset the courts for 
years." The area warrant is thus a step in the direction of writs 
of ass i s tan~e .~~ 
2. The individualized suspicion requirement 
An alternative safeguard the Court could have applied is an 
individualized suspicion requirement. Mandating individualized 
suspicion in permanent checkpoint stops would have been the 
next logical step in the Court's trend of requiring individual justi- 
fication for INS searches and seizures away from the border? 
This would require a field officer to justify the stop of any particu- 
lar car by articulable suspicious facts and resulting inferences. 
Both types of law enforcement discretion would be controlled 
by this requirement. Individual justification of each stop elimi- 
nates the arbitrariness from discretionary selection of cars. More- 
over, judicial review of law enforcement discretion in locating 
checkpoints ensures that the location is reasonable. While a 
checkpoint still involves some intrusion on the rights of innocent 
motorists, the inconvenience of driving through the checkpoint is 
not arbitrary because of congressional authorization and judicial 
review. 
The Court declined to apply an individualized suspicion re- 
quirement because it found both law enforcement and individual 
interests to be different for permanent checkpoint stops than for 
stops made by a roving patrol." Individual interests a t  permanent 
checkpoints were found to be different because checkpoint stops 
are subjectively less intrusiveg2 than roving patrol stops; further- 
more, the permanence of checkpoint location is a partial restraint 
on arbitrariness. Law enforcement interests at permanent check- 
points were perceived to be more compelling, since the check- 
points are central to all INS enforcement procedures away from 
the border. These interests were considered to be significant 
87. See generally Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez 
and Camara, 84 YALE L.J. 355 (1974). 
88. See notes 39, 44-45, 55-58, & 60 and accompanying text supra. 
89. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra. 
90. The dissent urged this requirement. 428 U.S. at 574-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
91. For an argument that the Court's factual analysis on these points was the main 
flaw in the opinion, see 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257 (1976). 
92. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. 
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enough in the checkpoint context to obviate application of the 
more stringent reasonable suspicion standard applied in the rov- 
ing patrol situation.g3 Moreover, a reasonable suspicion would be 
harder to develop at a checkpoint than on roving patrol because 
officers only view the car as it makes a fleeting stop."g4 Further, 
it  appears that no lesser standard of individualized suspicion 
could have been established to provide constitutional protectiong5 
and still permit operation of the checkp~in t .~~  Since the Court 
- -  - - - - 
93. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra. 
94. This raises the question whether or not a "fleeting stop" or a "roll-through" would 
be a seizure and subject to fourth amendment scrutiny. There was a factual dispute as to 
whether or not a "fleeting stop" was made in the instant case. The Court assumed it to 
be a seizure. 428 U.S. at 546 n.1. The Ninth Circuit had recognized stops based on founded 
suspicion developed as cars "rolled through" a checkpoint. United States v. Evans, 507 
F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). 
95. An individualized suspicion standard must be objective if judicial review is to 
ensure constitutional protection. When the Court established the reasonable suspicion 
standard in Terry it declared: 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is 
assured that a t  some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws 
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must 
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the 
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it  is imperative that 
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to 
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reason- 
able caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? 
392 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
This objective control is required to give protection similar to a warrant or probable 
cause determination that requires a neutral judicial officer. See Coolidge v. New Hamp- 
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971). 
In order to be a lesser standard of individualized suspicion, the standard could only 
be authorization of the stop on more tenuous articulable facts. But the more tenuous the 
facts, the closer it approximates unfettered discretion. One potential lesser standard that 
illustrates this difficulty is reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry. While Mexican ances- 
try is relevant to illegal alienage along the southern border, the majority of people with 
such ancestry are citizens or legal aliens and would be subjected to these seizures arbitrar- 
ily. Thus, this standard would not curb arbitrariness any more than leaving the discretion 
with the field officer. Reliance on Mexican ancestry alone has universally been held 
insufficient for establishing founded suspicion. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975); United States v. Del Bosque, 523 F.2d 1251, 1252 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1136 (1974); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1973). 
In the instant case, the majority condoned referrals to the secondary questioning area 
made "largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry." 428 U.S. a t  563. Since no 
justification was required for checkpoint stops, no facts needed to be relied on and the 
Mexican ancestry dictum was not essential to the Court's opinion. The majority implicitly 
recognized the inadequacy of such grounds by attempting to mitigate concern with reli- 
ance on Mexican ancestry by quoting statistics to demonstrate such ancestry was not the 
only basis for referral. Id. a t  562-64 nn. 15 & 17. The dissent took particular exception to 
this part of the opinion and pointed out many of the inadequacies and dangers of reliance 
on Mexican ancestry. Id. at  573 & n.4. 
96. The checkpoint ceased operation after the Ninth Circuit held the checkpoint 
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found the illegal alien problem to be serious, a loss of the deter- 
rent effect that permanent checkpoints have on alien-smuggling 
operationsg7 was considered to be too high a price for the protec- 
tion that reasonable suspicion would afford individual rights. 
While an individualized suspicion requirement protects indi- 
vidual rights and marshalls much judicial precedent, the Court 
properly recognized that it is not mandated by the Constitution." 
Although the fourth amendment's warrant requirements of prob- 
able cause and particularity require individualized justification, 
the reasonableness requirement for warrantless situations makes 
no such demand. Theoretically, any control on law enforcement 
action that would guarantee a person's security against unreason- 
able searches and seizures could satisfy the reasonableness re- 
quirement for warrantless intrusions without individualized sus- 
picion. Thus an individualized suspicion requirement is a part of 
the reasonableness protection for warrantless searches and sei- 
zures only when necessary to ensure individual rights. 
B. The Court's Balancing Analysis 
One analytical framework the Court has used to determine 
the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures is the 
balancing of public interests against individual interests." The 
objective of this balancing analysis is to determine which proce- 
dural requirements should apply to the search or seizure. In pre- 
vious decisions, this balancing analysis has resulted in procedures 
that are outgrowths of the fourth amendment's procedural war- 
rant requirements. loo 
The balancing analysis in the instant case, however, resulted 
warrant to be invalid and required founded suspicion. Bernsen, Search and Seizure on the 
Highway for Immigration Violations: A Survey of the Law, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 69, 73 
(1975) (Bernsen is General Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service). 
97. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. 
98. See 428 U.S. at 561. The traditional viewpoint has been that reasonableness is 
equivalent to probable cause or an individualized suspicion variant in warrantless situa- 
tions. This viewpoint is reflected in the dissent's accusation that the majority decision 
"empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Id. at 568. 
99. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). Accord, 
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960,973 (9th Cir. 1974) (Wallace, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Fuentes, 379 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd mem., 517 F.2d 1401 
(5th Cir. 1975). 
100. Brignoni-Ponce and Terry imposed the reasonable suspicion standard. Notes 48- 
50 and accompanying text supra. Although Camara did not require individualized suspi- 
cion as a result of the balancing, it did require the formalities of a warrant. Notes 55-56 
and accompanying text supra. 
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in a determination that no individualized suspicion was required 
to ensure reasonableness. The Court did not denominate its anal- 
ysis as a determination of reasonableness but simply declared 
that constitutional safeguards were determined by weighing "the 
public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the 
individual."101 The balance struck in the instant case was the first 
time the Court has permitted a warrantless intrusion without any 
of the procedural safeguards required for warrants.lo2 This pure 
reasonableness determination relies on checkpoint location and 
limitations on the extent of the seizure's intrusiveness to guaran- 
tee constitutional rights. 
While the Court's determination reflects the realization that 
a reasonableness determination does not automatically dictate 
the infusion of aspects of probable cause, the method it adopted 
in determining reasonableness fails to guarantee individual rights 
as the Court defined them in the instant case. The Court stated 
that the amendment's guarantee "prevent[s] arbitrary and op- 
pressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy 
and personal security of indi~iduals . ' '~~~ This widely articulated 
standard104 is in harmony with the acknowledged purpose of the 
amendment to control unfettered law enforcement discretion.lo5 
The difficulty with the Court's analysis is that the resulting con- 
trols on the extent of intrusiveness ensure that the seizure is not 
oppressive but do not control arbitrariness. Oppressiveness is cur- 
tailed by confining the stop to brief questioning concerning the 
motorist's right to be in the country and requiring probable cause 
to justify further inquiry or search.lo6 But the only control on 
arbitrariness is the nature of permanent checkpoint operation 
and location. Judicial review of this administrative decision fails 
to control the arbitrariness involved in selecting any given car for 
questioning. 
The efficacy of judicial review as a control on discretion is 
seriously impaired by the precedent established in this case. If 
the San Clemente checkpoint, located on the freeway between 
101. 428 U.S. at 555. 
102. See id. at 556. 
103. Id. at 554. 
104. Similar language was used to define the protected right in United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,895 (1975), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,878 (1975), 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 767 (1966), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
105. See note 86 and accompanying text supra. 
106. See 428 U.S. 557-60, 566-67. 
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two of California's largest cities is reasonable, it is unlikely that 
any checkpoint location within the 100-mile limit can be success- 
fully challenged. While the location was chosen to minimize in- 
terference with traffic along the route,lo7 the traffic volume is so 
large that only a small percentage of the cars can be stopped by 
referring them to a secondary questioning area.lo8 Because the 
discretion of field officers in selecting cars is unlimited, there is 
no control on arbitrariness. On the other hand, had the decision 
been limited to approval of the Sarita checkpoint, the precedent 
would not have condoned such arbitrariness for the simple reason 
that the Sarita checkpoint involved the stop of every car. 
The Court justified this unfettered discretion by weighing 
oppressiveness against arbitrariness: "As the intrusion here is 
sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to 
justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol Officers must 
have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for 
the brief questioning involved."109 Although the Court claimed 
this advanced fourth amendment protections by subjecting fewer 
people to the stops and facilitating traffic flow,l1° it distorted its 
definition of the individual's protected interest. Thus, the balanc- 
ing analysis is valid only if the Court foregoes its own definition 
of the individual's fourth amendment rights or holds those rights 
to be violable. 
Establishing reasonableness by balancing interests has the 
danger that individual rights may be extinguished by a strong 
public interest. Admittedly the public interest in this case is 
strong because of the extent of the illegal alien problemlll and the 
possibility that the checkpoint would cease operation if a more 
stringent standard had been required.l12 Yet the fourth amend- 
ment guarantees that the "right" (not merely an interest) to be 
- 
107. Id. at  562 n.15. 
108. In an eight-day period, 146,000 cars passed through the checkpoint, only 820 
were referred for questioning, and 171 contained illegal aliens. Id. at  554. 
109. Id. at 563-64. 
110. Id. a t  560. The dissent claimed that such a rationale failed to consider freedom 
from intrusion to be the norm and thus "stands the Fourth Amendment on its head." Id. 
at  572 n.2. 
111. The illegal alien problem is serious. In fiscal year 1963 the INS apprehended 
38,361 deportable aliens. By 1973 the number had risen to 498,123. United States v. Baca, 
368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (S.D. Cal. 1973). By 1975 the number of deportable aliens appre- 
hended had risen to 596,796, of which 579,448 were Mexican aliens. [I9751 INS ANN. REP. 
103. 
The San Clemente checkpoint alone apprehends approximately 17,000 illegal aliens 
per year. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). 
112. See note 96 supra. 
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secure from unreasonable searches and seizures "shall not be vio- 
lated." To define reasonableness as the weighing of personal 
against public interests will not ensure inviolability. If arbitrari- 
ness is an evil of unreasonable searches and seizures, as the Court 
suggests,l13 the balancing in this decision failed to cure that evil. 
Acknowledgement of law enforcement interests should not result 
in abrogation of fourth amendment rights.l14 This possible erosion 
of individual rights argues strongly against a determination of 
reasonableness by weighing individual interest against public in- 
terests. 115 
C .  An Alternative Proposal to Determine Reasonableness 
A close analysis suggests that reasonableness under the 
fourth amendment has two aspects: First, the reasonableness of 
authorizing the search or seizure without a warrant; and second, 
the reasonableness of the search or seizure procedural safeguards. 
The essence of the proposed analytical framework is to examine 
each of these questions separately and thereby segregate the im- 
pacts of public and individual interests in the reasonableness 
determination. The first examination takes public law enforce- 
ment interest into account in determining whether a warrant is 
required. The second takes the individual's fourth amendment 
right into account by scrutinizing the search or seizure procedural 
requirements to ascertain whether sufficient safeguards are pres- 
ent to guarantee that right. The consideration of public interest 
and individual rights in separate reasonableness determinations 
ensures that public interest cannot extinguish individual rights 
in the balance. 
113. See notes 86 & 103-04 and accompanying text supra. 
114. The Court refused to abridge constitutional rights for law enforcement necessity 
in Almeida-Sanchez. "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the 
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It 
is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to consti- 
tutional safeguards." 413 US.  a t  273. 
In United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U S .  916 (1975), 
the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning: "[Tlhe government argues that fixed- 
checkpoint searches, even if not the functional equivalent of border searches, should be 
upheld simply because they are urgently needed. . . . The short answer to this argument, 
however, is that necessity alone cannot override the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 967. 
115. This possible erosion is undoubtedly one of the reasons many argue for the 
equivalency of reasonableness and warrant requirements for warrantless searches and 
seizures. Individualized suspicion requires articulable reasons for incursions on any indi- 
vidual's rights. Such reasons are subject to review by a neutral magistrate to ensure that 
the facts and resulting inferences were reasonable. With this impartial review, the individ- 
ual rights are not as susceptible to extinction by considerations of public interest. 
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The examination of the reasonableness of authorizing a 
search or seizure without a warrant should begin by recognizing 
that a warrant should be required whenever feasible. If requiring 
a warrant defeats law enforcement interests, Congress or the 
courts could authorize a reasonable search or seizure without it. 
But if a warrant requirement is only an inconvenience to law 
enforcement objectives, reasonableness would demand a warrant. 
Clearly, any search or seizure pursuant to a warrant is still sub- 
ject to the reasonableness requirement for procedural safeguards. 
Provided the intrusion is not unreasonable per se,l16 the proce- 
dural requirements mandated by the Constitution, probable 
cause and particularity, will ensure reasonableness. Since these 
requirements always apply to a warrant, area or general warrants 
are precluded. Thus, a properly issued warrant will provide ade- 
quate protection of individual rights. 
Warrantless searches and seizures, however, demand closer 
analysis of the reasonableness of procedural safeguards. Since no 
procedure is specifically mandated, courts should scrutinize 
available procedures to ensure that an individual's fourth amend- 
ment rights are not abrogated. This necessitates clearly ascer- 
taining the substance of this right."' Freedom from arbitrary and 
oppressive intrusions on privacy and personal security, the defini- 
tion the Court used in the instant case, establishes a substantial 
and well-recognized standard.l18 
The procedural safeguards necessary to ensure reasonable- 
ness will be more stringent as the oppressiveness or the arbitrari- 
ness of the intrusion increases. Although increasing the strictness 
of the standard in proportion to the extent of intrusion suggests 
the potential for endless classification, llg it appears that warrant- 
less searches and seizures could easily be limited by the courts to 
three categories. 
The first category includes searches and seizures which, ab- 
sent exigent circumstances, would require a warrant. An example 
116. A search or seizure that is unreasonable per se would be one that "shocks the 
conscience" of the court. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (administration 
of an emetic to recover swallowed capsules). 
117. Since the precise nature of an individual's right is not explicit in the language 
of the amendment, it must be divined by the Court. Any concrete characterization of the 
right guaranteed by the fourth amendment is therefore fraught with peril. But this has 
not been and should not be an insurmountable barrier. If the definition becomes inade- 
quate to fully protect individual rights, it can be rectified by the Court through a more 
careful delineation of the standard. 
118. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra. 
119. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. 
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is the stop and search of a moving vehicle.120 Such intrusions 
should be strictly held to the probable cause requirement to pro- 
tect individual fourth amendment rights. The second category of 
searches and seizures, represented by the brief detention and frisk 
in Terry or the roving patrol stop for questioning in Brignoni- 
Ponce, is of sufficiently limited intrusiveness that the reasonable 
suspicion standard would prevent arbitrary and oppressive intru- 
sions. The third category involves searches or seizures of yet more 
limited intrusiveness such that those limitations on intrusive- 
ness, combined with controls on the circumstances under which 
the search or seizure is permitted, are sufficient to preclude arbi- 
trariness and oppressiveness. In this third category, individual- 
ized suspicion would not be required. Under this analysis, law 
enforcement interests are given greater effect than under an in- 
flexible requirement of individualized suspicion in every warrant- 
less situation. New categories should be acknowledged only upon 
establishing a very substantial distinction between the safe- 
guards available and the oppressive or arbitrary nature of the 
search or seizure. 
Applying this analysis to the instant case results in greater 
protection of individual rights than was afforded by the Court's 
analysis. The reasonableness of authorizing the seizure without a 
warrant has been established by statute and accepted by the 
Court.121 Thus, law enforcement interests have been recognized 
and accommodated in the proper context. The next question is 
whether or not the procedural safeguards are adequate. The sei- 
zures in the instant case were not oppressive, since they did not 
involve an arrest or search of the person, or a search or seizure of 
his possessions.122 They merely constituted a brief detention for 
questioning. Controls on arbitrariness, however, differ between 
the two checkpoints. Since all cars are stopped at the Sarita 
checkpoint, the arbitrariness of selective referral is not present. 
That seizure is therefore reasonable without further safeguards. 
120. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
121. The Court decisions beginning with Almeida-Sanchez have never questioned the 
statutory authorization to search or seize without a warrant. 
122. It could be argued that the officer's view into the car was a search. But this is 
not sufficiently intrusive to be oppressive. Such a search occurs wherever a law enforce- 
ment officer is authorized to be, thus discretion is controlled by checkpoint location. The 
holding in Brignoni-Ponce precludes this type of search for officers on roving patrol absent 
the justification of founded suspicion. 
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The potential for abuse of discretion in the referral system at San 
Clemente, however, violates freedom from arbitrary intrusions. 
Such discretionary selection would be constitutionally sound only 
when more adequate safeguards, such as reasonable sukicion, 
are provided. 
Requiring reasonable suspicion would in all likelihood render 
the San Clemente checkpoint in0perab1e.l~~ This is a serious con- 
sequence in view of the legitimate law enforcement interest in 
controlling illegal aliens. On the other hand, the precedent of 
permitting law enforcement interests to result in the abrogation 
of constitutional rights could have far reaching repercussions. 
The Court should not reach to such lengths to protect law enforce- 
ment interests. 124 
123. In fact the San Clemente checkpoint ceased operation when the Ninth Circuit 
imposed the founded suspicion requirement. See note 96 supra. Even under a founded 
suspicion requirement, however, the checkpoint may still be able to function by allowing 
founded suspicion to develop as cars roll-through or make a fleeting stop. See note 94 and 
accompanying text supra. 
124. These law enforcement interests are more appropriately protected by legislation 
that provides alternative law enforcement measures. The fourth amendment creates diffi- 
culties with current enforcement measures only when they are performed away from the 
border or its functional equivalents, because those crossing the border have different rights 
as compared to those within the country. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), 
the Court said cars could be arbitrarily stopped "in crossing an international boundary 
because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to iden- 
tify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully 
brought in." Id. at 154 (emphasis added). This power at  the border was reaffirmed in 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-84 (1975), and Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). Thus Congress could deal with the illegal alien 
problem by eliminating or reducing the need for checkpoints away from the border. 
There are two reasons for checkpoints away from the borders: First, many aliens enter 
a t  unpatrolled locations, and second, the border pass system is abused. If these reasons 
for removed checkpoints were obviated, then law enforcement interests would not suffer 
unduly by eliminating permanent checkpoints. 
Two possible alternatives exist that might remove that rationale for permanent, 
removed checkpoints. First, increased patrolling might be a solution to the illegal alien 
problem. Effective patrolling of the 2000 mile border is, however, a physical impossibility. 
Increased patrols have not proven productive in the past. See United States v. Baca, 368 
F. Supp. 398, 405 (S.D. Cal. 1973). Moreover, such patrolling may be prohibitively expen- 
sive (the Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of this fact in the instant case, 514 F.2d at  
318). Second, concerted efforts could be made to reduce the abuses of the border pass 
system. While border passes, authorized by INS regulations, 8 C.F.R. 4 212.6 (1977), could 
be granted in fewer cases or discontinued altogether, there are serious diplomatic and 
economic drawbacks to such a proposal. 
Since better employment is a primary reason for illegal alien entry, an alternative law 
enforcement technique could focus on reducing that incentive. One method would be to 
impose criminal penalties on employers of illegal aliens. See CAL. LABOR CODE $ 2805(a) 
(West Supp. 1976) (this statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), rev'g 40 Cal. App. 3d 976,115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974)). 
Current federal law specifically excludes employment from the punishable offenses consti- 
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The Court made significant strides in fourth amendment ju- 
risprudence by its break with the tradition that reasonableness in 
a warrantless situation requires elements of probable cause. This 
advancement, however, is not without its perils, the most signifi- 
cant of which is the balancing of public interests against individ- 
ual interests to determine which searches and seizures are reason- 
able. The proposed alternative analytical framework, with its 
emphasis on the individual's fourth amendment right to be free 
from arbitrary and oppressive intrusions, suggests a method of 
averting misuse of the precedent. 
tuting harboring illegal aliens. 8 U.S.C. 4 1324(a) (1970). To date, efforts to amend this 
provision to include employment have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., H.R. 982, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., Hearings on H.R. 982 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 3 (1975) (an earlier bill, H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., passed the House, 119 
CONG. REc. 14,208-09 (1973), but died in the Senate). Former INS Commissioner Chap- 
man has suggested that monetary penalties for employment might decrease the problem. 
Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 34, 40 (1975). Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, has expressed 
uncertainty as to the efficacy of this remedy. United States v. Ortiz, 422 US. at 900 
(concurring opinion). 
In any event, legislative action is the appropriate channel for vindication of law 
enforcement interests in the present context. 
